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of our interests: . . . even if nothing can exist except on condition that it is known: even then our knowing is not in any ordinary sense an act of construction or creation" (p. 8). Yet mere sense is declared inarticulate (pp. 64, 109); we never find in any presentation-continuum "all that might be there" (p. 22), and the idealistic inference is at hand that the reality which enters into sensation is likewise inarticulate, and thus unable to make good its claim to be the real. For the author "reality in the general sense is simply what does in any way present itself to us" (p. 69). As against pragmatism, reality "does not lie in wait for our thinking to make it," although "the discovery of reality does."

Naturally the same attitude appears in the investigation of the nature of error. "The most that we can say is that error means the failure of the real world to appear to us in a normal way" (p. 116), but why this account should invalidate other modes of description is not made clear.

The realistic position is maintained not without apparent contradictions, and the prophetic nature of the introductory warning that "throughout this essay we shall be on controversial ground" becomes apparent as we read. But each one of the chapters is full of interest for the special student of epistemology, presenting some problem that is of vital interest for a constructive metaphysical theory.

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The Evolution of Mind. By JOSEPH MCCABE. London, Adam & Charles Black, 1910.—pp. xvii, 287.

It is sometimes unfortunate that a scientific book should be judged by its pretensions. Mr. McCabe's book is well written, both from the standpoint of style and facility and clearness of expression. It would be a great gain to the scientific public if men qualified to write such books had the ease in writing and clearness of expression possessed by this author.

The author tells us that the issue of his work is quite distinct from that of modern psychology and from the work of Romanes and Lloyd Morgan. "My aim is, in short, to bring together whatever facts may be found to bear on the subject in a dozen sciences—chiefly, physics, organic chemistry, geology, paleontology, zoölogy, physiology, psychology, and anthropology"—surely a worthy, if colossal undertaking! Had the author claimed a modest knowledge, and had he admitted the reading of only a few well chosen works in comparative and human psychology, his criticism upon psychology and animal behavior might be allowed to pass unnoticed. But when in the introduction he says that he has "sought aid in the whole relevant literature of Europe and America," one feels disposed to make a few comments. In his chapter, "Mind in the Bird," he gives but a single reference to the bird literature of America and none to that of Germany, and there is no experimental literature on bird work in England except that of Morgan, which he cites. The single exception in the case of American literature is the reference to Thorndike's study of the chick. The work of Porter, Herrick, Scott, Conradi, Rouse, and others in this country is entirely unnoticed; as is also the work of Hess and others in Germany. Consequently, there is little in the chapter but references to anecdotal literature, largely to that of Romanes. It must be said in all fairness to the author that he fails to find in this anecdotal literature anything bearing upon the question of mind in birds. Had he been familiar with the American and German literature on bird life, however, he would not have found such a disparity in ability to learn and to 'imitate' between the birds and the mammals. The chapter on the mammal brain is also supported by Morgan's work, that of Hobhouse, and the one study of Thorndike, *Animal Intelligence.* He *regrets* the fact that Thorndike has never given us his promised study on the primates (*Mental Life of Monkeys*, Monograph Supplement, *Psychological Review*, 1901)! I cite these failures merely to show that the author has no scientific justification for undertaking to write about a subject with which he is so little acquainted.

To come to the author's contentions. He finds no justification for the modern notion of coupling intelligence with a trial and error type of learning He agrees with Weissmann's doctrine of unconscious thought, and finds in it an explanation of learning in most organisms below the mammals. We may form both conscious and unconscious associations. Learning can occur anyway in complex neural mechanisms (where the cortex is not highly elaborated) without any consciousness being present.

He fails to come to close quarters with the question as to where mind first becomes apparent. He examines the various orders of animals and gives us in a summarized statement the following vague expressions: "The Protozoa and the Cœlenterates may be summarily dismissed. In the succeeding worlds of the Worms, Molluscs, Echinoderms and Crustacea few and slender claims are made for the presence of an agency other than that of their nervous mechanism." "There may be a dull glow of consciousness in the fish."

With regard to the higher insects he is somewhat in doubt. "The only reliable (and still indirect) way to infer consciousness is from the structure of the brain, and the brain of the insect is so obscure, and so little analogous to that of man, that we can draw no confident conclusion." "The question remains whether the cerebral activities of the ant or the bee may not be accompanied with a dull glow of consciousness."

In the mammals we find our first advanced stage of consciousness. The author really attempts to make cortical differentiation the criterion of conscious development. All through his book he attempts to argue away from and to argue down the evidence from behavior where he fails to find a complex cortex. He does not show in any adequate way how the behavior of the simpler mammals differs from that of birds, fish, etc. His conclusion is really based upon structure.

He modestly leaves open the question of the ultimate nature of consciousness. He declines to see in it the emergence or accession of a new reality, "other than ether, or ether-compacted nerve." "Until we know the cortex sufficiently well to say that its structure throws no light on the nature of consciousness, the question must be left open." "Every portion of the cortex has, of course, been submitted to the finest microscopical examination. I am not ignorant of the work of Ramon y Cajal, Flechsig, Waldeyer etc. But it is none the less true that on the functional side the human brain is still *terra incognita.*" I may be doing the author an injustice in inferring that he apparently yet hopes to find consciousness in some region even more obscure than the pineal gland!

When the author comes to discuss the paleontological evidence bearing upon the "dawn of humanity" and "The Advance of Mind," he is dealing with a question with which he is apparently more at home. His treatment of the growth of the higher primates and earliest man-like forms in the different geological eras—of the slow development of higher mental processes in man, of the causes (crises, etc.) which led to a more rapid mental development—are all interestingly dealt with, but in a highly speculative way.

In conclusion we may say that the book cannot be judged by a scientific standard. In view of its many defects on the factual side and of the one-sided and warped view-point of the author, it is not even the type of readable book which ought to be recommended to the general public.

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The Works of Aristotle Translated into English: De mirabilibus auscultationibus. By LAUNCELOT D. DOWDALL. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1909. Pp. 46 (unpaged).

This member of the series of Oxford translations of Aristotle, published pursuant to the desire of Benjamin Jowett, is in itself insignificant, being in no sense the work of Aristotle, and the translation does not compare favorably with that of the major works already issued. But the treatise possesses a certain curious interest and the translation is adequate for the purposes of those who are likely to depend upon it. W. A. HEIDEL.

Death and Resurrection, from the Point of View of the Cell-Theory. By GUSTAF BJÖRKLUND. Translated from the Swedish by J. E. FRIES. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1910.—pp. xix, 205.

Gustaf Björklund is a compatriot of Swedenborg, and the present volume is characterized by the translator as "undoubtedly one of Sweden's most remarkable and interesting contributions to contemporary philosophy" (p. xv).

The author believes that he finds in the results of modern cytology a new way of solving the problem of the immortality of the soul. "Life is not a material force; no living being can therefore arise from dead matter; all life has a supernatural origin in a higher immaterial world" (pp. 122 f.). This is Björklund's position. He finds physical force and life to be two "essentially different principles" (p. 91). Opposing Büchner's endeavor to reduce human life and personality to "Force and Matter," Björklund shows the scientific inadequacy of materialism. Modern science has shown the impossibility of *generatio spontanea.* Harvey, Spallanzani, Hoffmann, and Pasteur have indicated with increasing certainty the truth of the principle *Omnem vivum ex*